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NORMING IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JONATHAN S. MASUR & ERIC A. POSNER†
ABSTRACT
How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an
industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but
more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be meaningless.
This raises the question whether the agencies use an implicit standard
or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue that agencies
frequently use an approach that we call “norming.” They survey the
practices of firms in a regulated industry and choose a standard
somewhere within the distribution of existing practices, often no higher
than the median. Such a standard burdens only the firms whose
practices lag the industry. We then evaluate this approach. While a case
can be made that norming is appropriate when a regulatory agency
operates in an environment of extreme uncertainty, we argue that on
balance norming is an unwise form of regulation. Its major attraction
for agencies is that it minimizes political opposition to regulation.
Norming does not serve the public interest as well as a more robust
standard like cost-benefit analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
A furious debate about how government agencies should regulate
when they are authorized to do so under general statutory mandates
has mostly neglected the question of how agencies do regulate. The two
questions are different, of course. The “should” question has focused
in recent years on the role of cost-benefit analysis, with scholars taking
sides pro or con, and some scholars advocating other standards like
feasibility analysis.1 In this debate, scholars cite agency regulatory
impact statements (“RIAs”), related materials, and judicial opinions,
but mainly do so in order to criticize or defend the agencies’
explanations for their regulations. They do not usually question the
agencies’ explanations or try to figure out the real determinants of
agency action.
A smaller literature looks at what agencies do. Some scholars
provide detailed case studies that report and evaluate the reasoning
used by agencies.2 Others have produced studies that evaluate agency
1. See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (advocating for feasibility
analysis or other alternatives to cost-benefit analysis); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER,
NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006) (arguing in favor of cost-benefit
analysis); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH
(2011) (same); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018) (same).
2. See generally, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY (1990) (providing a comprehensive account of the NHTSA’s process in regulating
automobile safety); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) (describing different approaches to risk regulation); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255 (2002) (describing the EPA’s decisionTHE
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regulations in aggregate to see if they generate benefits or costs, with
mixed results.3 Another strand of the literature focuses on the impact
of political influences on agencies.4 But there is little attention given to
how agencies decide whether to regulate, and—of particular interest to
us—how they decide on the level of regulatory strictness once they
have decided to regulate.
In this Article, we suggest that agencies often use a distinctive style
of decision-making, which we call “norming.” A norm is “a set standard
of development or achievement usually derived from the average or
median achievement of a large group.”5 We convert the noun into a
verb to capture what we think agencies are doing. In deciding how strict
to make a regulation, agencies may choose a level of strictness that puts
significant burdens on industry outliers—the firms with the worst
practices—while putting limited burdens or none at all to the firms
whose practices are of average quality or better. We call this practice
“norming” because it allows the statistical norm—reflecting the actual
practices of industries—to provide the source of the regulatory
standard. This has the effect of truncating the distribution at the lowquality end.
While agencies do not use the word “norming” to describe their
decision-making procedures, we show that they often engage in this
behavior. In some cases, a statute directs an agency to engage in
norming. In other cases, agencies have interpreted statutes to allow or
require them to engage in norming. And in still other cases, agencies
seem to engage in norming in tandem with other approaches, like
feasibility analysis or cost-benefit analysis.
After providing background in Part I, we document several
instances of norming in Part II. Our goal is not to survey agency
behavior exhaustively but to persuade the reader that norming is a

making process in regulating arsenic in drinking water); see also Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi,
Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 575 (2015)
(discussing judicial review of cost-benefit analyses).
3. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick Dudley, How Well Does the Government Do CostBenefit Analysis? (AEI-Brookings Inst. Working Paper No 04-01, 2004) (examining 74 costbenefit analyses of federal environmental regulations and finding varied quality).
4. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988)
(compiling Chicago school scholarships about the political process); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean
Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991) (describing the relationship between agencies and interest-group
politics).
5. Norm,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/norm
[https://perma.cc/F2FP-EN9H].
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sufficiently important agency practice to deserve scholarly and public
attention. In Part III, we evaluate norming from the standpoint of the
public good. Agencies often engage in norming, but should they? An
argument can be made that norming is a reasonable way to proceed
when regulators are highly uncertain about best practices, but we argue
that cost-benefit analysis is the better approach. The problem with
norming is that often even the average or high-quality practices within
an industry cause harm to the public, justifying a regulatory response.
We suggest that the major reason for norming is that it is politically
attractive. Industry opposition to regulation is often intense, but when
the burden of regulation falls on only the worst firms, the industry may
not be opposed to it. The leading firms in the industry may even
support the regulation because the outliers harm the reputation of the
industry or pose costly threats to the dominance of the stronger firms.
Finally, in Part IV, we further illustrate the attraction and limitations
of norming by discussing instances in which courts have engaged in
norming. The most familiar example comes from the jurisprudence of
the Eighth Amendment, which requires courts to strike down
punishments that are, in terms of harshness, outliers from the statistical
distribution represented by the states.
I. REGULATORY STANDARDS AND DECISION PROCEDURES
A. Legal Standards
When Congress creates administrative agencies and gives them
directions, it usually uses broad language that is susceptible to multiple
interpretations. For example, one section of the Clean Air Act, which
governs emissions from power plants, instructs the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to issue regulations that are “appropriate
and necessary.”6 The language means not only that the EPA should
issue regulations when appropriate and necessary, but also that the
strictness of a regulation should be “appropriate and necessary.”7
Anytime an agency regulates, it must choose a level of strictness, and
that level could range from zero or de minimis, to extreme—in this
case, for example, mandating an emission level of zero, which would
destroy the power industry. Congress evidently wanted the EPA to
avoid both extremes but gave no guidance as to how strict the

6. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
7. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015).
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regulation should be, within the vast range between de minimis and
maximal.
In other cases, Congress provided more concrete instructions
while still leaving much to the agency’s discretion. For instance, one
section of the Clean Water Act instructs the EPA to mandate the “best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”8
This language is less vague than “appropriate and necessary,” but it
still leaves much in doubt. Is the “best” technology the most effective
(i.e., cleanest) technology, or the most efficient (i.e., cost-effective)
technology? For a technology to be “available,” must it already be in
use, or can it be on the drawing board? And so forth.9
Agencies address these ambiguities by offering interpretations or
relying on decision procedures, which are reported in various
regulatory documents. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts accept
reasonable interpretations.10 The courts have sanctioned regulations
based on cost-benefit analysis as well as regulations based on other
types of methodologies.11 However, the fact that an agency has legal
authority under Chevron to select a particular level of regulation does
not mean that the level of regulation it selected was well chosen.
Agencies have been criticized frequently both for excessively strict and
insufficiently strict regulation.12 These criticisms are often based on
cost-benefit analyses, which evaluate regulations by comparing the
burden on industry or consumers with the monetized benefits the
regulations sought to achieve. In an effort to remedy this problem, a
succession of presidents (beginning with Reagan and extending
through Obama and Trump) have required most agencies to produce
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
9. The administrative state is far too vast, and the various regulatory statutes far too
numerous, for us to canvas even a small portion of them here. For a partial catalog of major
regulatory provisions which highlights the many variations in regulatory language see Jonathan
S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935,
982–86 (2018) [hereinafter Masur & Posner, Judicial Role].
10. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(explaining the doctrine); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 658, 668–70 (2010) [hereinafter Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis]
(discussing the relationship of courts to different types of analysis).
11. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 2, at 578 (documenting judicial deference to agency costbenefit analysis); Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1355, 1359 (2016) (documenting cases in which courts have been deferential to agency choice of
methodology).
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 197–240 (1982) (discussing
examples of over- and underregulation in the areas of trucking, rent control, and environmental
pollution).
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cost-benefit analyses each time they promulgate regulations with
economic impacts of more than $100 million per year.13 This
requirement has become entrenched.14
The fact that agencies are required to perform cost-benefit
analysis when regulating does not mean that they always use costbenefit analysis to decide how stringently to regulate. In some cases,
statutes appear to bar the agencies from relying on a cost-benefit
analysis.15 Moreover, even when they use cost-benefit analysis, often
different levels of regulatory strictness may all be consistent with a
cost-benefit standard. Accordingly, agencies have typically relied upon
a number of different decision procedures or methodologies for
selecting regulatory standards, which we describe below.16
B. Decision Procedures
Cost-benefit analysis. Under a cost-benefit analysis, an agency
issues a regulation if the benefits exceed the costs. The costs typically
include the expense of compliance, which may involve installing safety
devices, training workers, and discontinuing production methods—
capital and labor expenses borne by industry and passed on to
consumers as higher prices, shareholders as lower returns, and workers
as lower wages or layoffs. The benefits typically involve improvements
in public health, safety, convenience, and other forms of well-being.
The major virtue of cost-benefit analysis is that if, as is often claimed,
the regulator’s goal is to improve public welfare, the decision
procedure enables the agency to identify all aspects of public welfare
that the regulation might affect, and provides a straightforward means
for evaluating it.
The simple formulation masks numerous complexities and
problems, both normative and methodological—the topic of a vast
literature.17 We will not rehearse these problems here, except to note
13. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
14. See Masur & Posner, Judicial Role, supra note 9, at 944 (observing that statutes almost
always direct regulators to consider the costs and benefits of regulations).
15. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (holding that the
statute prohibits the EPA from considering costs in rulemaking).
16. See generally, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 1 (discussing decision-making
procedures that agencies rely on and comparing them to cost-benefit analysis); JAMES
MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41561, EPA REGULATIONS:
TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? (2016) (describing major EPA regulatory actions
involving a variety of methodologies discussed infra Part I.B).
17. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 1, at 37–40 (noting that cost-benefit
analysis tends to overestimate the costs of regulations); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis
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one of them that is relevant to our current topic. Because of the
complexity of the economy and human behavior, it is often difficult to
determine whether an incremental increase in the stringency of a
regulation will produce more net benefits or more net costs. Agencies
that demand a high degree of certainty before regulating may thus end
up regulating too little, while agencies that forge ahead despite
uncertainty are often accused of recklessness. For the same reason,
agencies may find it difficult to defend reasonable but speculative
judgments when their regulations are challenged in court.18
Feasibility analysis. Because some statutes require agencies to
implement regulations where “feasible,” an idea has developed that
agencies should conduct “feasibility analysis,” which means that the
agency should regulate as strictly as possible short of driving firms or
industries out of business.19 Agencies that conduct feasibility analysis
sometimes try to predict a regulation’s effect on unemployment within
the industry, and they curtail regulation if the predicted effect seems
excessive; at other times, they try to predict how many firms will be
driven into bankruptcy, and again curtail regulation if the number
seems too large.20
Feasibility analysis is, in principle, a simpler and more manageable
procedure than cost-benefit analysis because the regulator does not
need to evaluate all the effects of a regulation, only some of them. But
this is also the chief objection to feasibility analysis. Because consumers
and investors incur costs from regulation, and their well-being is part
of the public good, their losses should be taken into account by the
agency.21 Other problems with feasibility analysis include its focus on
of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2014) (pointing
out accuracy problems with using cost-benefit analysis); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2014) (detailing the
problems of applying cost-benefit analysis to financial regulations).
18. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the
Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 86 (2015) [hereinafter Masur &
Posner, Unquantified Benefits] (discussing this point); Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified
Benefits (Dec. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3087370 [https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-SWDK] (finding that EPA excluded identified
benefits from many CBAs due to data limitations).
19. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2005) (explaining the benefits and application of the feasibility principle).
20. See Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 657 (describing two
such regulations).
21. Id. at 682–84. But see David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest
Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 318–20 (2011) (providing
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business failure (which is not necessarily bad), and the ambiguity of the
regulatory standard.
Narrow tradeoffs. In some cases, agencies focus on a few of the
most important and salient effects of regulations while ignoring
others.22 Consider, for example, a regulation that approves a
pharmaceutical. The drug might reduce the risk of one bad outcome
(including death) but also create risks of others. In risk-risk analysis, as
this mode of analysis is sometimes called, the agency evaluates a
regulation according to its impact on a narrow range of severe risks
(death or serious injury or illness) while ignoring other effects on wellbeing, which may be difficult to quantify.
Like feasibility analysis, risk-risk analysis neglects many of the
welfare effects of regulation. Risk is not the only thing that matters; so
does, for example, the price tag on an automobile.
Quality-adjusted life years and cost-effectiveness analysis. In
healthcare regulation, an ambitious effort has been made to evaluate
medical procedures according to how much they extend life, adjusted
by quality.23 The approach reflects the intuition that a medical
procedure that extends life by ten years without alleviating suffering
might be worse than an alternative medical procedure that extends life
by eight years but does alleviate suffering. The quality-adjusted life
years (“QALY”) approach is meant to reflect that individuals often
prefer the second procedure to the first. Since cost remains a
consideration—hospitals cannot spend an infinite amount of money on
medical procedures—but is not directly included in the analysis, this
type of procedure is a type of cost-effectiveness analysis. On this
approach, the question is: Given a budget, how is that budget best spent
to advance well-being? A virtue of this approach is it avoids the
problems of monetization. The defect is that a budget must be
determined, and it is hard to see how the agency (or Congress) can
determine the budget in the first place without performing cost-benefit
analysis or another form of welfare analysis.
Break-even analysis. Sometimes an agency is able to estimate the
costs of a regulation but not the benefits; or, on rare occasions, the
normative justifications for feasibility analysis).
22. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS
RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 228–29 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
23. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYS and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1, 12–15 (2006) (discussing different approaches to evaluating the
quality of medical care).
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benefits but not the costs. This might be because the benefits are hard
to price, but it is more commonly used when the benefits themselves
are simply uncertain, such as when the agency is unsure how many
premature deaths the regulation is likely to prevent.24 In such a case,
an agency employing break-even analysis would calculate the “breakeven point”: the quantity of benefits that the regulation must produce
in order for costs to equal benefits.25 Thus, for instance, imagine that a
regulation is expected to cost $100 million, and the agency values each
life saved at $10 million. The break-even point for this regulation is ten
lives.
The problem with break-even analysis is that it does not actually
tell the agency whether or not to regulate (much less how stringently
to regulate).26 In the example above, what good does it do the agency
to know that the break-even point is ten lives if the agency does not
know how many lives the regulation will save? In order to actually
make decisions, the agency must formulate some estimate of the likely
benefits or have some intuitive sense of whether benefits will exceed
costs. Break-even analysis thus often reduces to a kind of incomplete
cost-benefit analysis.
Intuitive, or ad hoc, balancing. This approach involves a broad and
comprehensive look at all the possible effects of regulation, akin to
cost-benefit analysis, but without monetization of the benefits (and
sometimes the costs as well). In these cases, the agency often insists
that the benefits cannot be reliably monetized because of the
uncertainty of the effects of the regulation or the nature of the benefits,
which can be intangible and abstract, such as the pleasure that people
derive from knowing that wilderness is preserved even if they do not
visit it.27 When the agency regulates, it does so on the ground that the
benefits justify the costs even though a formal cost-benefit analysis
cannot be performed.
Intuitive balancing is ubiquitous in daily life as well as in
government. When employers offer amenities to employees, they often
rely on a rough intuitive sense and do not bother trying to do a cost24. Regulation does not actually “save lives,” in the sense that everyone will die eventually.
Accordingly, some experts speak of regulation as “prolonging life” or “preventing premature
death.” We use these various terms interchangeably here.
25. Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven Analysis,
102 CAL. L. REV. 1469, 1487–89 (2014).
26. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 93.
27. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis,
103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1815–16 (2017).
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benefit analysis, which may be unreliable. When governments build
monuments, parks, and other public amenities, they will typically
calculate the costs but often rely on a rough sense of the public interest
in these amenities rather than try to monetize the benefits. Thus,
intuitive balancing should not be dismissed as out of hand. But its
major defect is that because benefits and costs are not fully monetized,
the decisionmaker may make an error or be subject to some type of
bias. It is also difficult for outsiders, including researchers and auditors,
to evaluate the project.
Democratic procedures. Finally, agencies always solicit the views
of regulated entities, as required by law.28 Sometimes agencies go
farther and try to arrange agreements, votes, and other forms of
participation among those directly affected by a regulatory program.29
Within constraints, and subject to the agency’s supervision, a form of
democracy prevails, in the sense that the ultimate regulation or project
emerges from debate and presumably reflects the self-interested
calculations of the affected parties.30 Under the democratic approach,
the agency avoids the burden of evaluating potential regulations based
on a notion of the public good, but takes the risk that the democratic
procedure it chooses ends up excluding some affected people or giving
improper weight to sophisticated parties who figure out how to game
the system.
There are not always distinct lines between these approaches:
overall, agencies frequently adopt a kind of pluralistic approach,
defending their regulations by claiming that they are consistent with
multiple decision procedures. Agencies often estimate valuations and
report them without performing a complete cost-benefit analysis, or
estimate some valuations while ignoring others.31 Regulatory impact
analyses often include a range of overlapping approaches. In many of
them, agencies seem to engage in intuitive balancing and cost-benefit
analysis, and also to take into account concerns about feasibility and
unemployment.32 And, as we will demonstrate, actual agency practice

28. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (mandating opportunities for interested parties to voice their
opinions in the rulemaking process).
29. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256–57 (1997) (describing the process of negotiated
rulemaking).
30. For some examples, see Karen Bradshaw, Democratic Risk Management (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Duke Law Journal).
31. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 112–15.
32. Id. at 117–18.
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often involves a kind of norming, even if the agency is nominally using
one of these other decision procedures.
II. NORMING IN PRACTICE
A. What Is Norming?
Norming is yet another approach to regulation. It can take
different forms, and so, to ground intuitions, we start with a simple
example.
Imagine that the EPA must regulate a particular practice in a
particular industry, for example, ozone emissions from power plants.
Upon investigation, it learns that the various power plants emit
different amounts of ozone. There could be a number of reasons for
this variation. For example, some plants might have been constructed
more recently with the best new technology, which results in less ozone
emission just because of the efficiency of that technology.
Alternatively, some plants might have better technology because they
are operated more cautiously by managers who worry about legal and
reputational consequences, or because they are located in states or
other jurisdictions where local legal standards for pollution are stricter.
Or plants might not emit much ozone because of the particularities of
their location, which might allow them to use inputs or adopt
production processes that generate less ozone than other plants do. We
can imagine many other reasons; we explore some of them below. For
now, the basic point is that there will be natural variation in ozone
emissions across plants.
The exact shape of that distribution will also depend on the
circumstances, but our argument does not depend on that shape having
any specific form. The major point is that all (realistic) distributions
have tails. At the left tail, firms emit more ozone than other firms; at
the right tail, they emit less. In the middle of the distribution, the firms
cluster around average levels of emissions. We also bracket, within
limits, the nature of the variable in question. The EPA may be
concerned about the overall level of emission per plant; or the level of
emission relative to something else, like units of production; or the
costs that the firms have incurred in reducing emissions. The variable
will be normatively relevant to whatever EPA’s statutory mandate is—
presumably, to advance the well-being of people who are exposed to
the pollution, or of people generally (including consumers and
workers).
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To understand what norming is, let’s start with how the EPA
would approach the problem of setting a level of regulatory strictness
using cost-benefit analysis. In principle, the EPA could require firms
to reduce ozone emissions to zero (equivalently: to install expensive
technology or shut down production), or the EPA could impose a de
minimis regulation (requiring the plants to do nothing at all), or
anything in between. A cost-benefit analysis tells the EPA to set the
level that maximizes benefits (usually in terms of human health,
including reduced mortality risk, lower medical expenses, and so on)
relative to the costs to the firms. The best regulation based on a costbenefit analysis could turn out to require all firms, most firms, a few
firms, or no firms to reduce emissions. Everything depends on what the
underlying variables are.
In the case of norming, the EPA derives from the distribution
itself the proper level of regulation. We define norming to mean that
the EPA sets the level of regulatory strictness somewhere between the
best firm and zero. Every firm that exceeds the standard may continue
to conduct business as usual. Every firm that falls below the standard
must bring its production into compliance with the standard.
Figure 1: Examples of Norming
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Figure 1 illustrates the simple point we are trying to make.
Imagine that the horizontal axis represents a variable of interest to the
regulator—such as how effective a factory is at eliminating pollution,
with dirtier factories at the left end of the distribution and cleaner
factories at the right end of the distribution. The vertical axis
represents the number of factories at any given level of pollution.
While the examples in Figure 1 all show a normal curve, the
distribution could have any shape. The vertical line shows the “norm”
chosen by the regulator. The factories that fall to the left of the vertical
line are out of regulatory compliance. If the regulation is enforced,
those factories will be either shut down or brought into compliance. As
a result, the part of the post-regulation distribution represented by the
shaded area will be truncated.
An agency that engages in norming, as we define it, could set the
standard at any location along the distribution. A weak standard would
be located at the left side of the distribution; nearly all firms would be
in compliance. A strict standard would be located at the right side of
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the distribution; nearly all firms would be out of compliance. Norming
targets the tail of a distribution, but there is nothing inherent to the
concept of norming that defines how much of that tail—whether just
the worst-behaving firms, or a much broader swath of firms—will be
forced to change behavior. The distinctive feature of norming is that
the regulatory standard is internal to existing practices of the industry
rather than derived from exogenous factors like cost, benefit, and risk.
It is based on the distribution of existing firm practices, not an external
normative framework.
Another question raised by norming is the nature of the variable
of interest to the regulator. In our example, we suggested that an
agency might be concerned about the amount of pollution emitted per
factory. However, an agency might care more about the amount of
pollution per unit of production, or per unit of social benefit, or the
social harm per unit of production, or some other measure. As we will
see below, agencies norm on the basis of a range of different variables.
In some cases, agencies explicitly acknowledge that they are
engaging in norming, and sometimes the governing statutes even
require it. This is particularly true in the context of environmental law.
In other cases, another type of decision procedure, such as feasibility
analysis, reduces to norming as it is practiced by agencies. Finally, in a
third category of cases, agencies engage in norming as a shortcut,
anticipating that it will lead to good, though not ideal, regulation.
In the sections that follow, we survey some of the most important
regulatory agencies, spanning a wide variety of areas of law. We
demonstrate the ways in which those agencies rely upon norming in
their regulatory decision-making.
B. Environmental Law
The EPA relies substantially upon norming. In some cases, a
statute explicitly directs the agency to engage in norming; in other
cases, the agency has interpreted its governing statutes to require
norming, even when other options might be available. Here, we focus
on two EPA case studies, one based upon the Clean Water Act, and
one based upon the Clean Air Act. We then briefly survey other
sections of the environmental laws and describe the ways in which they
require the EPA to engage in norming as well.
1. Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act requires the EPA to
regulate the discharge of conventional pollutants from existing point
sources by mandating the “best practicable control technology
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currently available.”33 The statute further directs the EPA to
determine the best practicable control technology by considering:
the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, . . . the age
of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the
engineering aspects of the application of various types of control
techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact
. . . and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate . .
. .34

In applying this language, the EPA has employed a regulatory
methodology that it terms “average of the best.” The EPA identifies
the “best-performing” polluters within the category of polluters being
regulated—those who emit the least pollution—and requires all the
polluters to perform as well as the average of the best-performing
polluters—hence, “average of the best.” The “average of the best”
standard appears to have originated in congressional debates over the
Clean Water Act in 1972.35 The standard was initially proposed by
Senator Edmund Muskie, the sponsor and principal drafter of the
Clean Water Act, during Senate floor debates over the Clean Water
Act.36
One example of this methodology comes from the EPA’s 1987
regulation of producers of organic compounds, plastics, and synthetic
fibers.37 Manufacturers of these products emit a wide variety of
hazardous pollutants.38 In the course of its regulation, the EPA first
identified 304 sources of pollution—factories or plants—that would be
subject to regulation.39 Of these 304 sources, it then selected the ninetynine sources that were employing the “best” technology to control

33. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (2012).
34. See id. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
35. Thomas B. Arnold, Effluent Limitations and NPDES: Federal and State Implementation
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 15 B.C. L. REV. 767, 767–83
(1974).
36. 118 CONG. REC. 33696 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The
Administrator should establish the range of ‘best practicable’ levels based upon the average of
the best existing performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each
industrial category.”).
37. Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 Fed. Reg.
42,522 (Nov. 5, 1987).
38. Id. at 42,526–27.
39. Chem. Mfr. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 208–09 (5th Cir. 1989).
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emissions.40 Of those ninety-nine sources, the EPA then selected the
seventy-one that had achieved the greatest pollution reduction—the
plants whose emissions were no more than forty milligrams of pollutant
material per liter of water discharged into the public waterways.41 The
EPA set the regulatory standard equal to the average level of existing
pollution control at these seventy-one plants.42
At first glance, it might appear as though the EPA has normed to
a fairly stringent degree. In setting the regulatory standard equal to the
average of the best seventy-one plants, the agency pegged its regulation
to (approximately) the thirty-sixth-best-performing source, out of 304
sources subject to the regulation—roughly the 88th percentile of all
existing sources. However, the agency makes clear that the regulation
would not be nearly so onerous as that description might sound.
According to the agency, the appropriate technology was already “in
place at 156 of 304 direct discharging plants” to be regulated.43
Accordingly, of the 304 regulated emitters of pollution, roughly thirtysix would already be in compliance with the regulation, and another
120 would have the necessary pollution control equipment in place and
need only to operate it properly. Only 148 of 304 plants—49 percent—
were required to construct or install new equipment, at a total cost of
$215.8 million.44 Thus, the norm was set close to the median, as in the
first example in Figure 1.
This regulation dealt with “conventional” pollutants, which are
governed under the Clean Water Act by the “best practicable
technology” standard. Other sections of the Clean Water Act variously
direct the EPA to mandate the “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact,”45 the “best conventional
pollutant control technology,”46 the “best available technology
economically achievable,”47 and the “best available demonstrated
40. Id. at 208; Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52
Fed. Reg. at 42,534–35. The agency concluded that the best technology was “biologic treatment,”
followed by “secondary clarification as necessary to assure adequate treatment of solids.” Id.
41. Id. at 42,534–35.
42. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 870 F.2d at 208.
43. Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. at
42,536–37.
44. Id. at 42,537.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
46. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
47. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
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control technology.”48 Each of these standards involves some type of
norming, typically selected by the EPA with regard to the legislative
history of the Clean Water Act. For instance, the “best available
technology economically achievable” applies to the EPA’s regulation
of “toxic” pollutants,49 such as cyanide,50 which are especially harmful
to human health and can be fatal in small doses. Here, too, the language
is ambiguous and could permit the application of a variety of potential
standards. And here, too, the EPA has adopted a particular rule based
upon its reading of the legislative history. When regulating under the
“best available technology” standard, the EPA pegs its regulation to
the single best-performing plant—the source with the lowest level of
pollution emitted.51
This is, of course, the most stringent possible version of norming—
norming to the furthest right-tail outlier. However, while this is the
most stringent statutory standard contained within the Clean Water
Act,52 even this standard directs the agency to regulate based upon
technology that already exists and is in use within the industry. The
agency does not mandate the development or installation of new
technology that no firm yet employs.
2. Clean Air Act. Unlike the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act
includes a statutory standard that explicitly demands norming. Section
112 of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate sources of
“hazardous” pollutants, which are particularly dangerous airborne
chemicals that Congress and the agency have selected and listed.53 The
statute requires that the EPA regulate so as to produce “the maximum
degree of reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants.”54 The
48. Id. § 1316(a)(1).
49. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
50. 40 C.F.R. §§ 414.91, .101 (2018).
51. See Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing COMM. ON PUB. WORKS,
93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 170, 789 (Comm. Print 1973)). The production of organic chemicals,
plastics, and synthetic fibers also involves the release of these types of chemicals, and so the EPA
set limits on those types of pollutants in the same regulation as well. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
870 F.2d 177, 226–27 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers
Guidelines, Fed. Reg. 42,522, 42,538–40 (Nov. 5, 1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 416)).
David Driesen describes this approach as “follow-the-leader.” Driesen, Distributing the Costs of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection, supra note 19, at 44–46.
52. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 244 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
54. Id. § 7412(d)(2); see also id. § 7412(g)(2)(A) (“After the effective date of a permit
program . . . no person may modify a major source of hazardous air pollutants . . . unless the
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statute then defines “maximum degree of reduction” differently for
new pollution sources—those that are constructed after regulation is
already in place—and existing sources, those that predate regulation.
For new sources, the statute provides that the EPA must prescribe
emissions standards that are at least as stringent as “the emission
control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar
source.”55 This is equivalent to the Clean Water Act’s “best available
control technology” standard, though here it is written into the statute
rather than having been created by the agency. For existing sources of
pollution, the statute directs the EPA to promulgate standards that are
at least as stringent as “the average emission limitation achieved by the
best performing 12 percent of the existing sources.”56 This is the Clean
Air Act’s version of “average of the best,” here again written directly
into the statute.57
Notably, the statute does not require that the agency regulate only
to the standard set by the average of the best-performing 12 percent.
This is only a floor; the agency may regulate more stringently if it
wishes.58 In practice, however, the EPA regularly sets its regulatory
standards equal to the average of the best 12 percent. For instance, in
2004, the EPA issued a regulation limiting hazardous air pollutant
emissions from boilers and process heaters.59 These types of heaters
Administrator . . . determines that the maximum achievable control technology emission
limitation under this section for existing sources will be met.” (emphasis added)). This is
sometimes referred to as requiring the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT). The
two formulations are equivalent.
55. Id. § 7412(d)(3).
56. Id. § 7412(d)(3)(A).
57. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act in its current form was passed as part of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301,
104 Stat. 2399, 2531–74 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412). By the time this section
was enacted into law, the EPA had been using the “average of the best” standard (and the “bestperforming” standard) for decades. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. This provided
Congress with a model for how to draft the new statute.
58. The statute states that emission standards promulgated under this subsection:
[S]hall not be less stringent, and may be more stringent than—
(A) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the
existing sources . . . or
(B) the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 sources . . . in the
category or subcategory for categories or subcategories with fewer than 30 sources.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3).
59. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial,
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,218, 52,218 (Sept. 13,
2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). A process heater is a type of heater used to heat liquids, and
it is often used for food or chemical processing, hence the name.
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emit a range of hazardous chemicals, including arsenic and chromium.60
First, the EPA divided the boilers into eighteen categories and
classified the hazardous air pollutants into four types, for a total of
seventy-two boiler-pollutant subcategories to be regulated.61 In
accordance with the statute, the EPA then determined the “average of
the best” polluters for these seventy-two subcategories. For twenty-five
of them, the agency set emissions standards.62 For the other fortyseven, the agency refused to impose any sort of emissions limitation
whatsoever, because “the best-performing sources were not achieving
emissions reductions through the use of an emission control system.”63
That is, even the “best-performing” sources were doing nothing to
reduce their emissions.64
The EPA then announced that it would not impose more stringent
regulation than that dictated by the “average of the best.” The agency
explained:
As documented in the memorandum “Methodology for Estimating
Costs and Emissions Impacts for Industrial, Commercial, and
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants” in the docket, EPA did
consider the cost and emission impacts of a variety of regulatory
options more stringent than the MACT floor for each subcategory.
The EPA recognizes that for some subcategories, more stringent
controls than the MACT floor can be applied and achieve additional
emissions reductions. However, EPA also determined that the cost
impacts of such controls were very high. Considering both the costs
and emissions reductions, EPA determined that it would be infeasible
to require any options more stringent than the floor level.65

The document referenced in the EPA’s explanation does indeed
include cost estimates for two more stringent regulatory options.66
60. Id.
61. See id. at 55,222–24; Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
62. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1254–55.
63. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial,
and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg. at 55,233.
64. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 489 F.3d at 1254–55.
65. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial, Commercial,
and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 69 Fed. Reg at 55,237.
66. See Memorandum from Roy Oommen, Eastern Research Group, to Jim Eddinger, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methodology for Estimating Cost and Emissions Impacts for Industrial,
Commercial, and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants 9–14 (Oct. 2002) (providing cost estimates for two more stringent
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However, it does not include any comparison between the costs of
these regulatory options and the benefits they would be expected to
produce.67 For that, one must turn to the EPA’s own Regulatory
Impact Analysis (“RIA”). The RIA includes calculations of the costs
and benefits of the regulation the EPA eventually chose, plus one of
the more stringent alternatives described in the “Methodology”
document.68 Under both the rule the agency selected and the one
alternative it analyzed, the net benefits of the regulation are
significant—on the order of $15 billion, depending on the discount rate
chosen.69 At the same time, the EPA concluded that the more stringent
regulation would produce slightly lower net benefits than the laxer
regulation it selected.70
It is thus possible that the EPA was justified in regulating only to
the level of the “average of the best,” which meant leaving forty-five
heater/pollutant subcategories unregulated. However, the agency did
not analyze the other more stringent regulatory option described in the
“Methodology” document, much less a comprehensive set of
alternatives.71 By confining itself to an examination of existing
practices, rather than engaging in a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis,
the agency committed itself to norming.
Many other parts of the Clean Air Act similarly speak in the
language of norming, even though they do not require it so explicitly
as section 112 does. Above, we cited a section of the Clean Air Act that
calls for the agency to regulate to the extent “appropriate and
necessary.” As we noted, this ambiguous language does not offer the
agency much guidance and does not appear to contemplate norming.
But other parts of the law are clearer. One section instructs the EPA
to mandate the “best system of emission reduction . . . adequately

regulatory options in Tables 3-2 and 3-3).
67. Id.
68. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL
BOILERS AND PROCESS HEATERS NESHAP 10-2 tbl.10-1 (2004), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/
regdata/RIAs/indboilprocheatfinalruleRIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V49-RYHY].
69. Id. at 10-51. When costs or benefits will arise in the future, they must be “discounted” to
present value to reflect the fact that having a dollar today is more valuable than having the same
dollar in a year or ten years. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S.
Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1684 (2013) (describing
discounting).
70. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 68, at 10-51. The agency found that net benefits
would drop by $160 million, or approximately 1 percent of the total, if it adopted the more
stringent regulation. Id.
71. See id. at 10-2.
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demonstrated.”72 Another requires the “best available control
technology,”73 much like the Clean Water Act. And a third mandates
“reasonably available control technology.”74
All of these statutory formulations within the Clean Water Act
and Clean Air Act direct the EPA to norm. They instruct the EPA to
select a level of regulation based upon “available” or “achievable”
technology, presumably already in use by some regulated parties, and
mandate that technology across the board. While different statutory
sections of the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act call for regulation
at varying levels of stringency, they simply represent different levels of
norming. For instance, the EPA norms differently when it regulates
under the “best available technology” standard in the Clean Water Act
than when it regulates under the “best practicable technology”
standard.75 While the location of the “norm” may be different, the
underlying norming methodology is the same.
C. Workplace Safety
The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to
promulgate regulations regarding workplace safety. OSHA must
impose the regulation “which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.”76 This
statutory language gave rise to so-called “feasibility analysis,” which
we criticized in an earlier article.77 Under feasibility analysis, the
agency imposes the strictest possible regulation that will not lead to
mass layoffs or bankrupt significant numbers of firms within the
regulated industry.78
Feasibility analysis involves a kind of norming. In broad strokes,
the feasibility approach directs OSHA to avoid imposing substantial
regulatory costs on an industry. One obvious means of accomplishing
this is to set regulatory standards that many firms within the industry

72. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
73. Id. § 7475(a)(4).
74. Id. § 7502(c)(1).
75. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 220–21 (2009).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012).
77. See generally Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10 (critiquing
feasibility analysis).
78. Id. at 657.
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already meet, thus imposing no additional costs on those firms. Indeed,
this is precisely how OSHA often regulates. We offer three examples.
The first comes from a major OSHA rule on workplace air
contaminants.79 In this regulation, OSHA identified hundreds of
hazardous chemicals to which employees are exposed in the
workplace.80 In preparation for the regulation, OSHA surveyed over
1.1 million workplaces.81 It found that over 500,000 workplaces used
one of the chemicals being regulated.82 But of those 500,000
workplaces, only 131,005, or roughly 26 percent, “would incur some
costs to comply with the new limits.”83 That is, nearly 75 percent of all
workplaces that used one of the chemicals at issue were already in
compliance with the regulation.
OSHA’s relatively weak regulations were the result of a deliberate
choice. In setting these standards, OSHA did not engage in “true”
feasibility analysis, in the sense of determining how stringently it could
regulate without causing mass layoffs or significant bankruptcies.
Instead, it relied on standards that had been proposed by the American
Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (“ACGIH”).84
ACGIH standards are well known in the field for being relatively lax,
in part because the ACGIH largely relies upon industry surveys and
data when setting them.85 In fact, there was evidence that the ACGIH

79. Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Jan. 19, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
80. Id. at 2724–25.
81. Id. at 2728 tbl.B-2.
82. Id. at 2726.
83. Id. at 2727, 2728 tbl.B-2.
84. See id. at 2724–25 (“Four hundred of these exposure limits were based on the
recommendations of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) . . . .”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737 (“In [OSHA’s new air contaminants
standard], OSHA adopted less stringent standards for air contaminants by relying almost
exclusively on threshold limit values (TLVs) established by the American Conference of
Governmental and Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) . . . .”).
85. See, e.g., Barry I. Castleman & Grace E. Ziem, Corporate Influence On Threshold Limit
Values, 13 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 531, 537 (1988) (finding that many of the ACGIH standards were
promulgated with reference to “unpublished corporate studies”); James C. Robinson, Dalton G.
Paxman & Stephen M. Rappaport, Implications of OSHA’s Reliance on TLVs in Developing the
Air Contaminants Standard, 19 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 3, 10 (1991) (criticizing the ACGIH standards
for excessive reliance on industry reporting and inconsistency with the scientific literature);
Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 84, at 738 (“[T]he ACGIH ignores published scientific material
and relies more heavily on industry-supplied data . . . .”). In fact, OSHA’s regulation was even
laxer than the ACGIH guidelines would have dictated: “OSHA failed to designate 67 substances
covered by the rulemaking as carcinogens, and excluded an additional 68 substances from the
ruling altogether, despite the cancer designations from NIOSH, ACGIH, NTP, EPA, and IARC.”
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was itself engaged in norming, and that it had arrived at these standards
precisely because they were already in widespread use throughout the
industry. As a former chairman of the ACGIH committee charged with
devising the standards explained, some standards “have been based on
a decade or two of industrial experience . . . . Clearly, such procedures
can yield indisputable data on which realistic [standards] can be
derived . . . .”86 Another former chairman of the same committee even
alleged directly that the committee had been overly influenced by the
regulated industry and charged industry consultants with engaging in
“chicanery.”87 In the words of one pair of commentators, “[o]ur
conclusion is that [the ACGIH standards] for chemical substances are
a compromise between health-based considerations and strictly
practical industrial considerations, with the balance seeming to
strongly favor the latter.”88 It is little wonder that so few firms were
required to expend resources to comply with the new OSHA standards.
OSHA never explicitly stated that it was engaged in norming. It is
possible that it was unaware of the ACGIH’s reliance on norming, that
it arrived at these standards after some other type of analysis, and that
the resemblance to norming is mere coincidence. Yet it seems
reasonable to infer that the agency chose this standard precisely
because it had already been so widely adopted. OSHA was surely
aware that the ACGIH standards had already been widely adopted,
and it must have known of ACGIH’s reputation for adopting standards
congenial to industry. The standard is also lax—too lax, according to
most experts.89 The only thing to recommend the ACGIH standards is
the fact that they had already been widely adopted. It looks very much
as if OSHA was just norming to the 25th percentile.
Our second example is a 1991 OSHA rule regulating risks related
to bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B and HIV.90 The purpose
of the regulation was to mandate consistent and reliable safety
practices for workplaces, such as dentists’ or doctors’ offices, where
Dalton G. Paxman & James C. Robinson, Regulation of Occupational Carcinogens Under
OSHA’s Air Contaminants Standard, 12 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 296, 302 (1990).
This critique of OSHA’s Airborne Contaminants rule is trenchantly made by Shapiro and
McGarity as well. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 84 at 736–38.
86. S.A. Roach & S.M. Rappaport, But They Are Not Thresholds: A Critical Analysis of the
Documentation of Threshold Limit Values, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 727, 741 (1990).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004 (Dec. 6, 1991)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910.1030).
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workers might come into contact with blood.91 OSHA, however, did
not create the safety standards out of whole cloth. Rather, the
regulation mirrored a set of guidelines that the Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) had released years earlier.92 By the time OSHA got
around to promulgating the regulation, most businesses had already
implemented their own safety rules based upon the CDC’s guidelines
and were already in compliance with the rule or close to it. Here is how
OSHA described the status quo ante:
Since the requirements of the standard closely follow the guidelines
issued by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on universal
precautions (UP), efforts by many organizations to adhere to the
guidelines have created a solid base of practices and technology for
the supplemental implementation of the standard. Based on recent
surveys conducted by the Agency and other information available in
the rulemaking docket, OSHA produced quantitative estimates of the
compliance baseline, or extent of current compliance. OSHA found
that most establishments have already implemented measures to
protect workers from occupational exposure to blood and other
potentially infectious materials, and that many are very close to full
compliance with this standard.93

Sure enough, after surveying the regulated population, OSHA found
that pre-regulatory rates of compliance ranged as high as 85 to 90
percent for certain industries and certain requirements.94
It may seem odd or indefensible to criticize an agency for adopting
CDC guidelines in its regulation. After all, the CDC is presumably
expert in this area, and it may well have selected the optimal level of
precautions when formulating its guidelines. However, here that
turned out not to be the case. OSHA’s regulations proved to be
inadequate, particularly with respect to injuries from handling dirty
needles. In response, nine years later, Congress passed a new law, the
Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, mandating a new round of
bloodborne pathogen regulation.95 OSHA promulgated new standards,
and those remain in effect today.96
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 64,006–08.
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1993).
Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,039.
Id. at 64,060–63.
Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-430, 114 Stat. 1901 (2000).
Quick Reference Guide to the Bloodborne Pathogens Standard, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY
AND
HEALTH
ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/
bloodbornepathogens/bloodborne_quickref.html [https://perma.cc/PY7J-3FEN].
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As with OSHA’s air contaminant regulation, the agency never
states directly that it is engaged in norming.97 But we can infer that
OSHA likely adopted these standards because they were already in
such widespread use. OSHA’s industry survey predated its regulatory
decision. When it promulgated the regulation, it was aware that a high
percentage of firms were already in compliance. It is also unlikely that
OSHA arrived at these standards through any other type of decision
procedure. The standards are substantially weaker than what either
cost-benefit analysis or feasibility analysis would have dictated.98
Indeed, they were viewed as so insufficient that Congress passed new
legislation to mandate stricter standards less than a decade later.
Accordingly, even without any explicit indication, it is likely that
OSHA’s bloodborne pathogen regulations were the result of norming.
Our final example is a 2016 regulation of crystalline silica, which
can cause lung cancer and a variety of other serious illnesses if
inhaled.99 Here, too, OSHA’s regulation grew out of widespread
agreement on the part of both regulated industry and labor groups that
regulation was called for:
Both industry and worker groups have recognized that a
comprehensive standard is needed to protect workers exposed to
respirable crystalline silica. For example, ASTM International
(originally known as the American Society for Testing and Materials)
has published voluntary consensus standards for addressing the
hazards of crystalline silica, and the Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO also has recommended a comprehensive
program standard. These recommended standards include provisions
for methods of compliance, exposure monitoring, training, and
medical surveillance. The National Industrial Sand Association has
also developed an occupational exposure program for crystalline
silica that addresses exposure assessment and medical surveillance.100

97. Neither does the CDC, which did not have the same reputation as the ACGIH for
adopting standards dictated by industry.
98. Recall that under feasibility analysis, OSHA is expected to regulate to the greatest extent
possible without causing mass layoffs or widespread firm bankruptcies. Masur & Posner, Against
Feasibility Analysis, supra note 10, at 662–63. Here, fewer than half of the affected firms needed
to take any action at all, much less lay off even a single employee. Occupational Exposure to
Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,060.
99. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,286, 16,287
(Mar. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1926).
100. Id. at 16,297.
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Not surprisingly, OSHA eventually settled on a regulation with which
most industries were already in compliance. Based upon a series of
samples of existing firms, the agency found that 74 percent of general
industrial firms101 and 51 percent of construction firms already had
ambient silica levels below the new regulatory standards.102
Here, too, we have no direct evidence that OSHA was engaging
in norming, rather than feasibility analysis. But OSHA’s economic
analysis of its regulation is suggestive, because it seems to belie the
agency’s claim that it was engaged in feasibility analysis. In its
explanation of the regulation, OSHA argued that it had chosen to limit
workplace silica emissions to “the lowest level feasible for all affected
industries.”103 In this context, OSHA defines feasibility to mean that
compliance costs will be no more than 10 percent of firm profits or 1
percent of firm revenues.104 However, the agency found that
compliance costs would equal, on average, only 2.43 percent of profits
and 0.06 percent of revenues for maritime and general industrial
firms.105 For construction firms, the average costs would be even
smaller: 1.52 percent of profits and 0.05 percent of revenues.106 If
OSHA were serious about regulating up to the limit of what would be
economically feasible, one wonders why the agency did not select a
more stringent level of regulation that would impose greater costs on
industry.107 This raises the implication that OSHA chose the level of
regulatory stringency on the basis of something other than feasibility
analysis, such as norming.
101. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINAL ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT FOR
THE FINAL RULE FOR OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE CRYSTALLINE SILICA IV-29,
tbl.IV.2-B (2016).
102. Id. at IV-30, tbl.IV.2-C.
103. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. at 16,287.
104. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 101, at VI-97.
105. Id. at VI-14.
106. Id. at VI-97.
107. OSHA might justify its regulation on the grounds that, despite the low average costs,
there were eight discrete industries in which compliance costs would exceed 10 percent of profits.
Id. at VI-14. The agency defended its choice of regulation on the ground that firms in these
industries were unlikely to see their actual profits decline by 10 percent. In all probability, they
would be able to pass a substantial portion of their compliance costs along to consumers in the
form of higher prices without losing significant market share. See id. at VI-22. Whether this is
correct or not, the agency cannot have it both ways. Either these firms would suffer profit losses
in excess of 10 percent, in which case the regulation was too stringent and too costly by OSHA’s
own standard. Or they would not, in which case the regulation—which imposed average
compliance costs well below OSHA’s standard—was too lax and should have been strengthened.
In either event, this was not the outcome that feasibility analysis would have dictated.
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D. Financial Regulation
Banks are heavily regulated because they impose risks on the
economy. The harmful externalities arise from two sources. First,
because banks play a central role in the financial system, and because
banks are linked together through financial transactions, the collapse
of one bank can cause the collapse of the entire financial system,
resulting in a sudden withdrawal of credit from the economy. Because
businesses depend on credit, bank collapse can in turn cause business
collapse. Second, because the government supplies insurance to the
banking system—to minimize the risk of a financial crisis—banks
externalize some of the risks they take on the government and hence
the taxpayer. To deter excessive risky financial activities, the
government regulates banks.
Much of the risk caused by the banking system comes from banks’
reliance on demand deposits for the bulk of their capital needs. As a
result, banks are highly leveraged. High leverage leads to high returns
for shareholders, but also high risk, which is externalized on taxpayers.
To counter this risk, regulators impose capital requirements. These
regulations require banks to raise a certain portion of their capital from
equity. The capital requirement designates that portion—which has
varied from about 5 to 8 percent over the years.108 For a simple
example, if a bank owns assets worth $100, and the capital requirement
is 5 percent, then it can be funded with no more than $95 of debt. The
other $5 must take the form of equity.
Banks, like other businesses, do not necessarily maximize their
profits by relying as much as possible on debt. There are business
reasons—related to tax, corporate governance, and other
considerations—that cause business to choose varying mixes of debt
and equity. Many banks maintain relatively high capital ratios.109
However, the risk externality and government insurance cause banks
at the margin to substitute debt for equity.110
Congress has required regulators to set capital requirements, but
provided little guidance as to their levels.111 Regulators thus have had
considerable discretion in choosing the stringency of capital
108. See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy
Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853, 1866–71 (2015) (discussing the evolution of capital
requirement regulations in the U.S. from the 1970s to 2013).
109. Id. at 1875 n.102.
110. Id. at 1859–60, 1862–64.
111. See id. at 1874.
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requirements. In earlier work, one of us shows that rather than
determine capital requirements using cost-benefit analysis, regulators
have engaged in norming.112 They have chosen capital requirements
that were typically below the capital ratios that prevailed in the vast
majority of banks. The effect was to burden only the least capitalized
banks, the outliers on the distribution of capital ratios. Notably, the
financial agencies justified the capital requirements they chose based
on just this point—that the requirements would burden only a small
number of banks.
One of many examples comes from the mid-1980s. In 1983,
Congress passed the International Lending Supervision Act, which
required the bank regulators to “achieve and maintain adequate capital
by establishing minimum levels of capital” for the banking system.113
The language provides no guidance whatsoever. But because the
statute was passed in response to an earlier banking crisis, the agencies
understood that they were supposed to raise capital levels. In 1985 the
bank regulators raised capital requirements to 5.5 percent for primary
capital and 6 percent for total capital.114
None of the three major regulators explained why they set capital
requirements at these new levels. What they did say was that that the
new levels would affect relatively few banks. The Comptroller of the
Currency, which regulates national banks, said:
[A]pproximately 95% of all national banks had a primary capital ratio
in excess of 6%, a level which would exceed the primary capital
requirement established by this regulation. In addition, most of the
larger multinational and regional banks (which generally have lower
capital ratios than smaller banks) had primary and total capital ratios
which would exceed the minimum requirements.115

In other words, the regulation would affect only a small percentage of
banks—5 percent of them. This is a classic example of norming.
There is good reason to believe that the regulations were far from
adequate. Most economists believe that capital requirements should be
much higher.116 Decades later, after the financial crisis, regulators

112. Id. at 1882–93.
113. International Lending Supervision Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1153,
1280 (1983) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (2012)).
114. Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,207, 10,208 (Mar. 14,
1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 7).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
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finally jacked up capital regulations to a respectable level.117 Norming
may have been tempting in earlier years because it allowed bank
regulators to impose restrictions on the worse banks without stirring
resistance from the entire industry. But with the benefit of hindsight,
we can see that this approach was a serious mistake.
E. Automobile Safety
The regulation of automobile safety by the Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) has been, from its inception, an exercise in
norming. In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, which delegated authority to the DOT to
promulgate safety regulations.118 The law directed the relevant agency
officials to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle
safety standards. Each such Federal motor vehicle safety standard shall
be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall
be stated in objective terms.”119 The law then specified that the DOT
should immediately engage in at least two rounds of regulation. For the
first round of regulation, the law required the DOT to “issue initial
Federal motor vehicle safety standards based upon existing safety
standards.”120 That is, Congress explicitly instructed the agency to set
its initial regulatory standards according to what firms in the industry
were already doing. For the second round, the law merely directed the
agency to issue “new and revised” safety standards.121 The Motor
Vehicle Safety Act thus resembles section 112 of the Clean Air Act, in
that norming is explicitly written into the language of the statute.

WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104 (2013); David Miles, Jing Yang &
Gilberto Marcheggiano, Optimal Bank Capital, 123 ECON. J. no. 567, Mar. 2013, at 1, 2; John
Cassidy,
Interview
With
Eugene
Fama,
NEW
YORKER
(Jan.
13,
2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/interview-with-eugene-fama
[https://perma.cc/
9XRT-EC9V] (recommending a higher equity capital requirements); John H. Cochrane, The
More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304911104576444482440753132 [http://perma.cc/
2EUK-KEG7]; Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche, Bank Capital:
Lessons From the Financial Crisis 13 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Fin. & Private Sector
Dev.
Team
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
5473,
Nov.
2010),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3955/WPS5473.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/MR86-TZFK].
117. See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 59–61 (2018).
118. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(1966).
119. Id. § 103(a), 80 Stat. at 719.
120. Id. § 103(h), 80 Stat. at 720.
121. Id.
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In 1970, the National Commission on Product Safety
commissioned an outside report by a group of lawyers and law
professors to evaluate the DOT’s progress in regulating auto safety.122
The report found that twenty-nine of the agency’s first thirty-four
regulations had minimal effect on how automobiles were designed and
built.123 The report concluded:
[T]he best that may be said for the safety standards issued thus far is
that they incorporate some of the best of current practice in the
automobile industry.
Almost every performance requirement was derived from industry
development and practice. Industry has led and Government has
followed. The agency has chosen from among industry’s best practices
those suitable for issuance as performance requirements. If this
pattern continues, progress in the issuance of safety standards could
move no faster than industry’s progress in developing and putting into
practice particular safety advances.124

This remained the case even after the agency was no longer required
to promulgate regulations “based upon existing safety standards.”125
As one study put it, “As a practical matter, however, the ‘existing
standards’ requirement of the statute far outlived the initial rules. The
point is well illustrated by the second generation of safety standards . .
. . These thirteen rules were no more innovative than the first
generation had been.”126
Decades later, the DOT—and its subunit, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)—now regulates under new
authority from new statutes that do not require norming so explicitly.
Nonetheless, the agency still regularly engages in norming, though not
to the same degree as in the late 1960s. Consider, for example, a 2011
NHTSA rule meant to protect automobile occupants from being
thrown from their cars during accidents.127 In 2005, Congress passed a
122. See HOWARD A. HEFFRON, RICHARD J. MEDALIE, STEPHAN KURZMAN & MARIAN R.
PEARLMAN, FEDERAL CONSUMER SAFETY LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF THE SCOPE AND
ADEQUACY OF THE AUTOMOBILE SAFETY, FLAMMABLE FABRICS, TOYS, AND HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES PROGRAMS 1 (1970).
123. Id. at 56–59.
124. Id. at 60; see also MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 2, at 70 (“It was also becoming clear
that public regulation had been largely ineffectual in forcing automotive technology.”).
125. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act § 103(h), 80 Stat. at 720.
126. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 2, at 78.
127. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at
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law aimed at preventing deaths from accidents in which automobiles
flipped or rolled over, sometimes referred to as “rollover crashes.”128
That law directed the DOT to “initiate rulemaking proceedings, for the
purpose of establishing rules or standards that will reduce vehicle
rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such
crashes,”129 and, like the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, required that those
standards be “practicable.”130
Rollover accidents can become particularly deadly if automobile
passengers and drivers who are not wearing seatbelts are thrown from
the vehicle through a window. NHTSA thus set out to promulgate
regulations that would keep automobile occupants inside of their
vehicles even if they did not wear seatbelts. There were two potential
technologies: side curtain airbags, which would deploy in the event of
a crash and hold occupants inside the automobile; and advanced
lamination techniques for automobile glass (“advanced glazing,” in
industry parlance) that would prevent window glass from shattering on
impact.131 These two technologies are complementary, and the agency
could have mandated both.132 Nonetheless, it opted to require only the
former—the installation of side curtain airbags.133
Although the agency does not admit as much, norming appears to
be a significant part of the reason that it elected to require only airbags
and not advanced glazing as well. By the agency’s calculation, 55
percent of Model Year 2011 automobiles were already equipped with
side curtain airbags that would trigger in the event of a rollover
accident.134 Even some much older automobiles met the regulatory
standards, including the 2004 Honda Accord135 and the 2003 Toyota

49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585).
128. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, Title X, § 10301(a), 119 Stat. 1144, 1939 (2005).
129. 49 U.S.C. § 30128(a) (2012).
130. Id. § 30111(b)(3).
131. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3213–15.
132. See NHTSA, OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FMVSS NO. 226 EJECTION MITIGATION 135 n.164 (2011).
133. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3212. To be precise, the agency set a
safety standard—based upon what would happen to a vehicle occupant subject to a crash of a
particular level of force—that could be met by installing only the airbag technology, rather than
both technologies in tandem.
134. See NHTSA, supra note 132, at 46.
135. See id. at 136.
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Camry.136 Model Year 2011 automobiles typically arrived on the
market in fall 2010, and the regulation was not set to take effect until
September 2014, around the time that Model Year 2015 automobiles
would be released.137 Accordingly, it is likely that by September 2014,
many more than 55 percent of automobiles would have included the
appropriate type of airbag.138 By contrast, advanced glazing was far less
common within the industry.139
The comments that the DOT received are instructive. Automobile
manufacturers and their trade groups—including the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers, and firms such as Ford and General
Motors—were generally supportive of the new rule.140 The
manufacturers complained that the regulations were somewhat too
stringent,141 which is to be expected; if the regulation had been weaker,
even more than 55 percent of existing automobiles would already have
been in compliance. But they generally favored the agency’s decision
to require only airbags and not advanced glazing as well.142 Some
comments were explicit on this point: “Ford commented that side
glazing retention in real-world rollover crashes is random and
unpredictable and expressed the belief that FMVSS No. 226 should be
focused on rollover-activated side curtain technology . . . .”143

136. See id. at 137.
137. See id. at 46.
138. The agency did note that as few as 53 percent of the currently deployed airbags would be
fully effective per the terms of the regulation. Accordingly, only 29 percent of existing
automobiles would require no modifications to become compliant with the regulation. Id. at 112–
13. Nonetheless, the other 26 percent of automobiles with curtain airbags that were not fully
compliant would likely only require minor modifications in order to make them compliant.
139. John D. Rowell, The Sordid History of Auto Safety Glass, HG.ORG
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/the-sordid-history-of-auto-safety-glass-19112 [https://perma.cc/
E48A-2F34]. DOT’s regulatory impact analysis seems to imply that no new cars would have
advanced glazing without additional regulation because the costs and benefits of glazing are based
on adding it to all 16.6 million new light vehicles that are sold annually. See NHTSA, supra note
132, at 120–21.
140. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3212, 3220 (Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. On the other side, both consumer-oriented public interest groups (including Public
Citizen) and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (an insurance-funded research
organization) argued that the regulation should have required or incentivized manufacturers to
add advanced glazing as a complement to airbags. Id. at 3221. These groups presumably possess
far less political clout than the nation’s automakers in combination.
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The regulation easily passed a cost-benefit analysis: the DOT
projected approximately $2.3 billion in benefits (based upon
preventing 373 fatalities and 476 serious injuries per year) against only
$507 million in costs.144 This is not surprising. Norming will often lead
to regulations that pass cost-benefit tests, precisely because lagging
firms are only being asked to install technology that leading firms have
already validated. The question is whether the DOT could have
generated even greater net benefits by requiring advanced glazing in
addition to side curtain airbags. Here, the evidence is less certain; the
agency did not offer a precise estimate of the costs and benefits of
advanced glazing.145 But the agency’s imprecise calculations suggest
that mandating advanced glazing in addition to curtain airbags
plausibly could have increased the regulation’s net benefits.146
In sum, the DOT selected a regulatory standard that was probably
weaker than cost-benefit analysis would recommend and had already
been adopted by more than half of the industry (and was therefore
supported by the industry). This suggests that the agency was engaged
in norming, and that reliance on norming, as opposed to some other
type of decision procedure, may have led the agency to promulgate a
suboptimal regulation.
III. NORMING: COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. The Case for Norming
While we are skeptical that norming is a proper method for agency
regulation, we begin by sketching out a possible defense of it. To fix
intuitions, imagine an industry that consists of a large number of firms.
The firms sell to consumers who are mostly different from the residents
who live near their production facilities; only the residents are harmed

144. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3293 tbls.42, 43 & 45. These are the
cost-benefit figures at a 3 percent discount rate. Using a 7 percent discount rate, the benefits are
slightly lower but still much greater than the costs.
145. The agency was unable to estimate exact costs and benefits for advanced glazing on the
rear window and sunroof because it was unsure of the effectiveness of such glazing in preventing
ejection from a vehicle in the event of a crash. NHTSA, supra note 132, at 115–34. The DOT did
calculate the expected number of lives saved and costs of using advanced glazing on the front and
side windows (along with air bags). According to the DOT’s estimates, advanced glazing on those
windows would cost $1.153 billion and save 83 lives. Compare id. at 159, Table VI-2 (lives saved
with airbags only) with id. at 164-65, Table VII-5 (lives saved with airbags plus advanced glazing).
The DOT does not compute a CBA for advanced glazing on the side and front windows alone.
146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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when the firms pollute. Assume that the firms are identical in all
respects except two. First, every firm emits a different amount of
pollution into the atmosphere in the course of manufacturing consumer
goods. We can imagine the firms arrayed along a horizontal line, from
the most-polluting firms to the least-polluting firms, with most of the
firms clustered in the middle around the mean level of emissions.
Assume that the firms differ with respect to the quality, sophistication,
and hence expense of the pollution-control technology they use; the
firms that have invested more in that technology emit less pollution.
Second, every firm charges a price for its products that is inversely
related to the amount of pollution that it emits. The most-polluting
firm charges the lowest price; the least-polluting firm charges the
highest price; and so on. Accordingly, we assume that the cost savings
that a firm enjoys when it avoids reducing emissions are passed on to
the consumer in the form of lower prices.
Before we analyze regulatory approaches, we should address an
obvious question, which is how such variation is possible in the first
place. In a perfectly competitive market, consumers would buy from
the most-polluting firms because they offer the lowest prices and the
consumers are not affected by the pollution; the other firms would go
out of business. But in a more realistic setting, variation is not
surprising. If the price differences are small, consumers might not be
influenced by them, and prefer instead to buy from trusted brands or
convenient outlets. Some firms might enjoy market power because of
their location or other advantages. The firms might vary because they
have installed pollution-control technologies at different times, have
gambled with technologies that turned out to perform better than or
worse than average, or are managed differently. Variation in state tort
law and regulation may also account for differences in the firms’
pollution-control technologies.
Let us first consider how a regulator would approach this industry
if it uses cost-benefit analysis. The regulator would ask whether the
higher-quality pollution control equipment generates benefits greater
than the costs. The benefits accrue to nearby residents who inhale the
pollution, while the costs are borne by consumers who buy the
products. Notably, the regulator would not pay attention to the
variation among firms with respect to the pollution control technology
that they use and the amount of pollution they emit. The cost-benefit
analysis could reveal that even the least-polluting firm pollutes too
much—the harms to residents exceed the benefits to consumers. If so,
the regulator would issue a regulation that burdens all the firms,
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requiring all of them to install more technology and reduce emissions
to a level below the best-performing firm. Alternatively, the costbenefit analysis could also reveal that none of the firms should be
regulated—even the worst-performing firm produces benefits greater
than the costs. Any other level of regulatory stringency is also possible.
By contrast, an agency that followed the norming approach would
use the distribution itself to set the level of strictness mandated by the
regulation. For example, this could involve requiring all firms to use
the quality of pollution-control technology, or emit pollution, at a level
at least as good as that of the median firm. Of course, one could
imagine other approaches roughly consistent with the idea of norming.
The regulator might choose a level of stringency that affects only the
bottom X percent of firms—where X could be five, ten, seventy-five,
or any other number.147 The idea of norming does not tell us how much
of the tail of the distribution is targeted; only that the regulator takes
the distribution as given and targets some portion of the tail.
Under what conditions could norming be superior to cost-benefit
analysis? The major challenge of cost-benefit analysis is estimating
valuations. The regulator must value both the benefits of a regulation
(in our example, health benefits, including saved medical costs) and the
costs (in our example, the cost of pollution-control technology). Both
types of valuation can be difficult. Many benefits of regulation are hard
to monetize, including avoided mortality risk, intangible health
benefits like fewer headaches, and enhancement of natural beauty. The
cost of regulation also can be hard to estimate because technology can
change rapidly, causing compliance costs to fall. When an agency
engages in norming, it avoids having to estimate costs and benefits,
which also means it avoids the risk that calculation errors will cause it
to issue a regulation that is too strong or too weak.
Still, norming can be superior to cost-benefit analysis only if there
is reason to believe that the firm above the regulatory threshold is
emitting the optimal amount of pollution, or at least that it is closer to
the optimum than a regulator using cost-benefit analysis could get. But
why would firms voluntarily incur costs to reduce pollution below the
profit-maximizing level? There would need to be a source of constraint
on pollution independent of federal regulation. We can imagine such
constraint arising from several sources.
First, the variation could come from state law. Imagine that in

147. Or conceivably, 100.
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most, but not all states, an optimal (or at least very good) tort or
regulatory regime prevails. If most firms are in the states with the
optimal tort regime, then most firms will issue the optimal amount of
pollution. The firms that issue an excessive amount of pollution are
located in the states with suboptimal tort law. A federal regulation that
required all firms to use the pollution control technology of the median
firm, or to emit no more pollution than the median firm, would
eliminate the inefficient outliers in the spirit of norming. Here, the
national regulator may lack the information needed to conduct costbenefit analysis but can piggyback off the independent efforts of state
courts and regulators around the country.148
Second, the variation could come from market structure. Imagine
a form of market segmentation in which most firms offer reasonablequality products to most consumers while a few firms offer low-quality
products to unsophisticated consumers. Such segmentation occurs in
many industries. For example, in credit markets banks tend to offer
higher-quality products—lower-risk loans that are adequately
explained—than do some mortgage brokers, payday lenders, and other
bottom feeders, which offer complex and risky products that lure
unsophisticated borrowers. A regulator could believe that by
mandating the terms and product features of the best firms, it will drive
out of business the firms that pose unreasonable risks to consumers.
Third, the variation could come from management choices made
under different levels of information, and reflecting different risk
preferences among managers and investors. Imagine, for example, that
entrepreneurs set up exchanges or clearinghouses in order to act as
intermediaries among various sophisticated market agents. The
entrepreneurs must choose various features of their business, for
example, the magnitude of margin requirements. In making this choice,
the entrepreneur must balance the costs and benefits of its customers.
Different entrepreneurs make different judgments, resulting in
variation across institutions. A regulator who thinks that uniformity is
desirable might reasonably believe that the median balance is optimal,
and accordingly mandate it by regulation.149
148. An important case of this involves preemption, when federal regulators issue regulations
that preempt diverse state legal regimes.
149. The idea is formalized in the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which has been widely discussed
in the academic literature. See generally Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the theorem); Paul H. Edelman, On Legal
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2002) (same); Eric A.
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In many cases, we observe private associations choosing to
mandate standards among their members. When they do so, they
typically observe a distribution of practices and choose a standard
somewhere in the middle. The familiar ethical codes of conduct among
lawyers, accounting standards, medical standards, and so on illustrate
this approach. The regulator may believe that the association chooses
a standard that protects the reputation of the industry and endorse it
through regulation because the association is in a better position to
assess benefits and costs than the regulator is. The regulator thus
converts the industry standard into a licensing requirement or other
independent source of law.
Generalizing from these examples, we conclude that norming may
be superior to cost-benefit analysis when (1) estimating costs and
benefits is extremely hard for the government; and (2) the industry in
question either does not create negative externalities (in the area in
which the regulator regulates) or is forced to internalize them by other
sources of law, considerations of reputation, and so on. When these
conditions are met, the argument for norming boils down to a claim
that the large number of firms that cluster around the median are more
likely to have made a correct judgment than the small number of
outliers. The regulator thus uses the pattern of behavior of the firms as
a source of information that is more easily obtainable than the
information needed to estimate the costs and benefits of particular
technologies.
B. The Problems with Norming
While the case for norming may be sound on theoretical grounds,
we are skeptical that the empirical conditions for norming prevail in
many markets. We are also concerned that norming may cause
independent problems, such as cartelization, and may be susceptible to
political misuse. We leave political misuse for Section C and address
the other issues here.
Costs and benefits. The case for norming rests on the difficulty of
estimating costs and benefits. While in some quarters commentators
remain skeptical about cost-benefit analysis,150 this decision procedure
has become routine in government because of its many advantages.
The quantification problem arises for many reasons: some benefits
(e.g., longevity, natural beauty) are hard to measure; so are some costs,
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006) (same).
150. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 17, at 890.
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because of the speed with which technology changes; and it is often
difficult to trace out chains of causation from regulation to business
behavior. Yet these problems are ubiquitous in ordinary life—for
businesses as much as for regulators—and quantification remains the
standard procedure. When uncertainty exists, one makes rough rather
than precise estimates. And when uncertainty is high enough, the
normal solution is not to adopt some other procedure for regulation
but to refrain from regulating in the first place. Regulators, like
businesses, can reduce uncertainty by investing in research.
If businesses use cost-benefit analysis (often referred to as net
present value analysis in the corporate context) to evaluate projects,
then regulators can, too. Agencies can also put in place institutional
procedures that allow them to revisit cost-benefit analyses that rely on
uncertain estimates and revise them as necessary, learning from
experience.151
Externalities; market regulation. Our second basis for skepticism is
that most regulation is necessary because of the problem of
externalities, and norming is a particularly unwise approach to
regulating externalities. Take the paradigmatic case of pollution. Firms
pollute in order to keep their costs down. Because the harm is borne
by third parties, the firms do not face any penalty in the absence of a
legal response, except possibly a reputational penalty if the pollution is
discovered.152 If the legal or regulatory response is itself based on the
activity of the median firm, then the law will allow harmful levels of
pollution rather than stopping it. While the norming regulator may shut
down the worst polluters, it would do much better using cost-benefit
analysis if the median or above-median firms also emit excessively high
levels of pollution, as one would predict from normal market
incentives.
In the previous section, we provided some scenarios in which state
law or reputational sanctions prevent the worse kind of abuse, and so
norming could be justified.153 But the scenarios do not seem likely to
prevail in practice. A major reason for federal regulation is that state
regulation is inadequate. Reputational sanctions are also typically

151. For a discussion, see Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 125–36.
152. Howard Gensler, The Economics of Pollution Taxes, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 1, 4 (1995) (“Pollution is an externality. That is to say, pollution is a legitimate expense of the
production process which ought to be borne by the manufacturer. The parties to the transaction
do not face all the costs because the manufacturer avoids the pollution clean-up costs.”).
153. Except possibly in the case of regulations designed to preempt inconsistent state law.
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weak. The best case for norming arises when the industry does not
generate externalities, but since the major reason for regulation is to
counter externalities, this best case will not arise very often. Exchanges
and clearinghouses, for example, are regulated because of the negative
external effects caused by financial crises, which the collapse of an
exchange or clearinghouse could spark. If these institutions did not
produce negative externalities, there would be little reason to regulate
them in the first place.
Cartelization. Many economists believe that firms have used
regulation to raise barriers to entry into their industry.154 A common
interpretation of licensing requirements, for example, is that they
mandate business practices that most firms in the industry already use,
while forcing out marginal firms or excluding new entrants who can
offer the same goods and services at lower prices if they are not
required to engage in the median or normal practice.155 If the business
practice is unnecessary and undesired by consumers, the effect of the
regulation is to reduce competition, which benefits incumbent firms
while harming consumers. Because the norming approach does not
involve direct evaluation of the benefits and costs of existing business
practices, the regulator may end up mandating business practices that
reduce competition. Indeed, as we argue in Section C, this may explain
why norming seems to be a regulatory approach that businesses
support.
Indeterminacy. As our case studies illustrate, norming is merely an
umbrella term that covers a vast range of regulatory stringency. The
standard does not itself tell the regulator whether to regulate at the
50th percentile, the 1st percentile, or the 99th percentile. One can
narrow down the approach by making certain assumptions. If, for
example, the firms in the industry do not generate externalities on
others, there is a theoretical reason for using the 50th percentile.156 But
if the firms do generate externalities, a higher percentile should be
used. The case studies also show another problem: how does the

154. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 5 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 367 (1988).
155. John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational Licensing,
64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 855–56 (2017) (describing this line of critique of licensing and cataloguing
the many individuals and parties who have advanced it).
156. This conclusion would follow from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Adrian Vermeule,
Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4–9 (2009) (describing the
theorem and observing that “as the number of members in the group increases, the probability
that a majority vote of the group is correct tends towards certainty”).
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regulator identify the behavior that should be “normed”? For capital
regulation, regulators initially relied upon simple capital ratios based
only on the proportion of equity to assets. As it became clear that these
ratios did not accurately measure the risk level of banking because they
ignore the riskiness of the underlying assets and liabilities, regulators
moved to a more complicated system.157 In the environmental
examples, it was never clear why the EPA chose one measure of
pollution rather than another. We suspect that agencies resolved both
of these issues by relying either on an informal cost-benefit test or
succumbing to pressure from industry or other interest groups.
C. The Political Appeal of Norming
This brings us to the biggest concern with norming: that it is an
appealing way to regulate from a political rather than a social
standpoint. Agencies may choose to norm rather than conduct costbenefit analysis or another procedure because norming is easier, less
vulnerable to judicial and public scrutiny, and less likely to provoke
political opposition from industry. There are a number of reasons for
this.
First, as we have observed, the major advantage of norming is that
it puts a low burden on the resources of agency decisionmakers. Rather
than perform studies of the costs and benefits of various technologies,
the regulator need only survey industry practice. While the limited
resources of regulators may justify the use of shortcuts from time to
time, this particular shortcut is extreme.
Second, norming may be appealing because it shields regulations
from judicial review. Because norming puts less of a burden on
regulators than cost-benefit analysis does, regulators that use norming
are also less likely to make identifiable errors that can be used against
them when regulations are challenged in court. In the case of costbenefit analysis, regulators can be (and have been) criticized for using
inconsistent discount factors and valuations; ignoring relevant
academic studies; underestimating costs and exaggerating benefits; and
so on.158 Because there is an established methodology for performing
cost-benefit analysis, industry can retain credible experts to identify
these errors.159 While courts rarely strike down regulations due to
157. See Posner, supra note 108, at 1854–56, 1880–81.
158. Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 18, at 112–13, 126–27.
159. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 41 (2003),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf.
[https://
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errors in cost-benefit analysis,160 the litigation risk is real, and a
significant preoccupation for agencies.161
By contrast, when an agency engages in norming, the only way for
the regulator to err is to mischaracterize the distribution of industry
practices, or to choose a threshold that is inconsistent with the statute
or the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act.162 There is nothing complicated about the first task. If,
for example, the relevant variable is the expense of the safety
equipment that has been installed in factories, or the amount of
emissions, then the regulator will be able to rely on either publicly
available data or data collected from the industry, and it is simply a
matter of describing the distribution.
The choice of the regulatory threshold is more complicated. An
agency could, in principle, set the threshold exactly at the mean, near
the bottom of the tail, or nearly anywhere else on the distribution. The
issue here is that since there is no technical way to do so—no
established formula or procedure that provides a baseline against
which errors could be identified—it would be difficult for a challenger
to explain to a court why the chosen regulatory threshold is
improper.163
perma.cc/N3VF-VFWL].
160. But see Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating
Exchange Act Rule 14a-11 because the SEC failed to adequately consider the rule’s effect on
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” and thus failed to “apprise itself . . . of the
economic consequences of a proposed regulation”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the EPA failed to give adequate weight to the statutory
mandate that it promulgate “the least burdensome, reasonable regulation required to protect the
environment adequately” and remanding the regulation to the agency).
161. See generally Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2013) (reviewing the impact of a series of cases invalidating
SEC rules on economic analysis grounds and raising the bar for such analysis in regulations).
162. Agency decisions are reviewed by the courts to determine if they are “arbitrary [and]
capricious,” a type of review that is sometimes referred to as “hard look review.” See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(a) (2012); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42–43 (1983) (describing how the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied).
163. However, in an early case a court struck down a capital regulation, and in doing so put
its finger exactly on the problem with norming:
Mr. Vaez’s testimony [that the Bank “ranked near the bottom of its peer group in all
of the equity related ratios”] does not demonstrate a correlation between the Bank
ranking towards the bottom of its peer [sic] in an analysis of equity related ratios and a
finding that the Bank’s capital level was unsafe and unsound. Obviously, this peer
group analysis indicates that a majority of banks, approximately the same size as
Bellaire Bank, maintain a higher level of equity than Bellaire Bank. This analysis may
indicate that further investigation is needed. It does not, by itself, prove that the Bank’s
capital level was unsafe and unsound. It is very possible that all the banks in the peer
group are maintaining a safe and sound capital level. Without a connection between
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Third, because norming tends to result in low regulatory burdens
for most of the regulated industry, industry opposition is likely to be
muted, relative to more aggressive regulatory approaches like costbenefit analysis. This is a version of regulatory capture, in which
agencies make decisions so as not to upset the interests of dominant
members of the regulated industry.164 In the area of financial
regulation, for example, it is well known that banks tend not to
challenge regulations. While commentators have argued that banks
refrain from challenging regulations because they fear retaliation from
regulators,165 another reason might be that the banks believe that the
regulations actually serve their interests or are weak enough to be
tolerated. The automobile industry’s largely positive response to
NHTSA’s side curtain airbag regulation offers a similar example.166
In sum, while norming may be justified under narrow conditions,
agencies might use it more generally because it is easy to do and
protects them from opposition and scrutiny.
IV. NORMING ELSEWHERE IN THE LAW
While the administrative state is the subject of our article, it is not
the only locus of norming. The same political dynamics that make
norming attractive to regulators can make it similarly attractive to the
courts. In particular, judicial decisions that force wholesale changes on
state or private actors can engender significant political opposition.167
Norming, by contrast, limits political opposition to a court’s decision

the peer group analysis and a finding of unsafe and unsound capital levels, therefore,
the peer group analysis does not support the Comptroller’s finding that the Bank’s
capital level was unsafe and unsound.
First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 1983).
However, such cases appear to be rare.
164. See Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter &
David A. Moss eds., 2014); Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 203, 216 (2006); cf. Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of
the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701, 749 (2017) (criticizing the SEC as “complicit” in the mutual
fund industry’s unchecked expansion, leading to “[i]ndividual investors . . . being systematically
under-informed and overcharged billions”).
165. See, e.g., Scott Polakoff, Fear of Retaliation Stifles Banks’ Appeals to Regulators, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/fear-of-retaliation-stiflesbanks-appeals-to-regulators [https://perma.cc/3AMQ-HWT8].
166. See supra Part II.D.
167. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007) (describing the potential for outrage directed at
judicial decisions).
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by making allies of those who are already in compliance with the new
standard. Accordingly, we should expect to witness norming across
multiple areas of judge-made law. In the sections that follow, we
describe some of those areas and evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of norming in judge-made law.
A. Constitutional Law
Many constitutional scholars believe that the Supreme Court
engages in a procedure akin to norming. In many cases, when people
challenge a law of a particular state, the Court surveys the relevant laws
of all the states. If few or no other states have enacted such a law, the
court might find in this pattern a “consensus” on certain constitutional
values. The “outlier” state is ruled out of constitutional bounds, and its
law is struck down.
This procedure is best known from Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Eighth Amendment bars criminal punishments that
are “cruel and unusual.”168 The Court has ruled that these terms are to
be understood in light of “evolving standards of decency,”169 evidence
of which is supplied by the practices of the states and even of foreign
countries. For example, in Coker v. Georgia,170 the Court struck down
a law that imposed the death penalty on those convicted of raping an
adult woman. After pointing out that “[a]t no time in the last 50 years
have a majority of the States authorized death as a punishment for
rape,” and pointing to other indications that most states disapprove of
this practice, the Court ruled that the punishment is cruel and unusual,
and hence unconstitutional.171 Following the same style of reasoning,
the Court has struck down laws that impose the death penalty on
children172 and intellectually disabled people173 who commit capital
crimes.
Some scholars have argued that, in Judge Easterbrook’s words,
the Court “obliterates outliers” in many other areas of its
jurisprudence, including equal protection and substantive due

168.
169.
(1958)).
170.
171.
172.
173.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 593–97.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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process174 Consider the contraception ban struck down in Griswold v.
Connecticut175 or the sodomy law struck down in Lawrence v. Texas.176
In both of these cases, the Court took an outlier-extirpation approach,
ruling against a single state or small number of states whose laws
deviated in significant measure from the laws of other states.177 It is
possible to see this type of logic in the Court’s procedural due process178
and Second Amendment179 cases as well. The Court’s occasional
reference to the laws of other countries also fits this pattern. When
deciding Eighth Amendment or due process cases, the Court
sometimes surveys the laws of other countries—particularly developed
democracies—to ascertain whether American law is an outlier.180 This
is norming of a more stringent type, where the U.S. is normed to a high
standard set by just a few countries. It is the constitutional version of
the EPA’s “average of the best” standard.
This practice can be compared with other constitutional methods.
Originalist scholars, for example, argue that a court should strike down
statutes that violate the original understanding of the Constitution.181
It is irrelevant whether any, many, or most states have similar statutes.
If certain gun control laws violate the Second Amendment, it is
irrelevant whether most states have those gun control laws: they must
all be struck down. Another standard view, according to which courts

174. The phrase comes from Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 349, 370 (1992); see also Fourteenth Amendment–Due Process Clause–Criminal Procedure–
Nelson v. Colorado, 131 HARV. L. REV. 283, 292 n.88 (2017) (describing the same process).
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
176. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
177. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). (“Frequently the Court takes a strong national consensus and imposes it
on relatively isolated outliers.”). For a recent critical discussion, see generally Justin Driver,
Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014).
178. E.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 48 (1996) (arguing that the fact that one-fifth of
states apply a procedural rule militates in favor of its constitutionality).
179. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008) (arguing that District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), is best
seen as akin to Griswold because both cases invalidated national outlier policies).
180. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark
reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (“To the
extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the
reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”).
181. See generally BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN G. SCALIA, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (explaining and advocating for originalism in
constitutional interpretation).
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should protect minorities shut out of the political process,182 also rejects
the relevance of frequency of such statutes. If most or even all states
have laws that discriminate against racial or sexual minorities, for
example, those laws are still unconstitutional. It would make no sense
for a court committed to protecting minorities to uphold those laws, or
limit itself to striking down the most discriminatory statutes in the very
worst states while upholding less discriminatory statutes in the
remaining states.
The Court’s norming practice has been the topic of considerable
debate, with a great deal of attention paid to whether the Court has
applied the outlier-extirpation approach in a consistent and reasonable
matter. On the merits of the procedure, many scholars seem skeptical.
They argue that a consensus among the states does not necessarily
reflect much about the views and constitutional values of the people,
or even of the state legislatures.183 A few scholars have suggested that
the Court’s approach could make sense.184 As Cass Sunstein puts it,
“consensus may have epistemic value: if most people believe that X is
true, X may well be true, certainly under favorable conditions.”185 If
most states believe that executing intellectually disabled people is
cruel, then it may well be cruel.
As Sunstein’s comment suggests, the case for outlier-extirpation is
informational, just as the case for norming is. The difference between
the administrative and constitutional settings is that the regulators are
mainly concerned with facts about the world—whether a type of
pollution causes harms, for example—while in constitutional cases the
focus is on moral or constitutional values.186 If such things as
constitutional values exist, and if they are reflected in state legislation,
then the Supreme Court may discover those values by observing the
practices of states rather than relying on the possibly defective

182. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980) (advocating for a process-based approach of constitutional interpretation that
balances majority representation and minority participation).
183. See Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
475, 520–23 (2005).
184. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 187–210 (2009); Posner & Sunstein,
supra note 149, at 136 (“[T]he Jury Theorem formalizes the simple intuition that the practices of
others provide relevant information, and that courts ought not to ignore such information.”).
185. Sunstein, supra note 179, at 265.
186. Facts also matter. For instance, it may be important to know whether the death penalty
deters if that is relevant to the ultimate constitutional question. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note
149, at 145.
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intuitions of the justices. The logic of information aggregation applies
in both cases.
The Court’s jurisprudence shows the benefits and limits of
norming. On the one hand, the Court’s use of norming seems
understandable because in many cases it has no external standard for
evaluating the laws of the states. To the extent that these laws reflect
information—about facts or values—they can reasonably be used as a
source to derive a national standard if such a standard is called for. On
the other hand, the Court’s approach is vulnerable to the objections
that we have seen. If state legislatures do not independently reflect on
the advisability of these laws before enacting them, or if states are not
trying to arrive at socially optimal answers, the normative force of the
pattern is questionable.
A major difference between agency practice and judicial practice
is that the agencies are far more concerned with behavior that
generates externalities. Where, as we have discussed, a business
practice causes harms to third parties, the regulator should try to stop
that practice or at least restrain it. While the firm at the center of the
distribution causes less harm than the outlier, both firms should be
regulated. In contrast, most of the Supreme Court cases we have
discussed do not involve externalities in such a straightforward way. If
Connecticut bans contraception, it does not harm people in Oklahoma
or California. There are other areas of the law that restrict states from
imposing externalities on each other—for example, the dormant
commerce clause, which blocks states from imposing trade barriers on
each other. Because the states externalize costs through trade barriers,
the outlier-extirpation approach would be unwise and does not appear
to be used by the Court, as one would expect.
B. Incorporation of Custom in the Common Law
Another style of norming occurs in pockets of the common law
where courts derive legal standards from the customary practices of
firms. In tort law, for example, courts frequently use custom to
determine the level of due care for the purpose of establishing whether
a defendant acted negligently. Custom may supply evidence of due
care, or even the standard itself.187 This is common in the area of
medical malpractice, among many others, where doctors are held to the
187. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing that custom should trump cost-benefit
analysis in determining the standard of due care).
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community standard rather than required to comply with an
independent cost-benefit analysis.188 In contract law, courts sometimes
use industry custom to fill in gaps or resolve ambiguities in contracts.189
Incorporation of custom also sometimes occurs in statutory
interpretation, especially when statutes are vague and subject to
judicial elaboration over time. In intellectual property law, industry
standards are used to determine the meaning of fair use and the point
at which an invention becomes obvious,190 among other concepts.191
Examples in common and statutory law can be easily multiplied.
Incorporation of custom can be contrasted to other methods for
resolving common-law disputes. In tort law, a defendant’s behavior can
be subject to a cost-benefit test, like the Hand formula. In The T.J.
Hooper,192 Judge Hand himself rejected custom as a defense because
he believed that industry customs will be insufficient to protect third
parties.193 In contract law, judges may prefer to rely on more traditional
methods of contractual interpretation, such as scrutinizing the
evidentiary record for the intentions of the parties, which may deviate
from custom. These approaches can lead to different levels of liability.
In tort law, if an industry adopts a common practice that externalizes
harm on third parties, then a court that defers to custom will hold liable
only the worst offenders, while a court that uses a cost-benefit test may
end up holding liable everyone or nearly everyone in the industry.
In theory, custom can be efficient, or otherwise desirable, but even
its major defenders agree that the conditions under which it is efficient
are limited.194 When an industry consists of similarly situated agents
who enter into repeated interactions with each other—trading goods
and services, for example—it is easy to see why, as a matter of theory,

188. E.g., Bobo v. Bryant, 706 So. 2d 763, 764 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (“The only issue on appeal
is whether Bobo produced the substantial evidence required to substantiate her claim that Dr.
Bryant had breached the applicable community standard of care.”).
189. See Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65–66 (2015)
(presenting an empirical study of cases dealing with trade usage under the Uniform Commercial
Code).
190. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
191. See generally Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (discussing the impact of custom on intellectual property
law and challenging its widespread incorporation).
192. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
193. See id. at 740 (“[T]here are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission.”).
194. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 283–84 (1991); Epstein, supra note 187, at 32.
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the customs they adopt might be welfare-maximizing for the group. But
custom is less likely to be welfare-maximizing if the agents have
different levels of wealth, market power, and sophistication, and
especially when their customary behavior externalizes costs on third
parties.195 An industry “custom” of discharging toxic waste in public
waterways is not likely to be desirable from the social perspective.
Incorporation of custom into the common law offers an analogy
to norming in agency regulation. In both cases, the legal decisionmaker
uses community standards—the “norms” of business behavior—to
determine legal standards, and in doing so targets outliers while sparing
the normal or above-normal firm from liability. Given that regulatory
agencies have inherited many of the functions of the common law
courts, it may be unsurprising that regulatory agencies have adopted a
practice that has been common among those courts. But this is not to
say that the practice is wise.
CONCLUSION
Many regulators engage in norming—setting regulatory standards
on the basis of what existing firms are already doing. In some cases,
norming is explicitly written into the statutes that authorize regulatory
action; in other cases, agencies have adopted norming as a matter of
their own discretion. In either case, the result is that agency regulation
is often tethered closely to existing industry practice.
It is possible to mount a defense of norming as appropriate agency
practice. If firms within an industry are already self-regulating in some
manner, that is a strong indication that the regulation will provide at
least some health and safety benefits without unduly harming the
industry. An agency process of norming and re-norming over time
could act as a ratchet, increasing the level of regulatory stringency in a
manner that consistently passes a cost-benefit test. If agencies are
trying to ensure that they first do no harm to the industry, there is a lot
to be said for norming.
But norming is inferior to cost-benefit analysis. Norming unduly
privileges the status quo; cost-benefit analysis does not. There is an
irony in the fact that critics of cost-benefit analysis have long derided
it as a tool used to block beneficial regulation.196 In fact, agencies
195. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 172–79 (2002).
196. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1553, 1578–81 (2002) (describing the
various ways in which cost-benefit analysis leads to undercounting of benefits, overcounting of
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themselves have hamstrung regulation by engaging in norming rather
than following whatever regulatory course cost-benefit analysis would
dictate.

costs, and thus underregulation).

